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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-CoNVICTION WITHOUT EVIDENCE OF

GUILT-Petitioner was convicted in the Police Court of Louisville, Kentucky,
of two offenses. After seeing petitioner "dancing by himself" on the dance
floor, the police charged him with loitering;1 when he became argumentative
about this arrest, he was also charged with disorderly conduct.2 Although
he protested that he had come into the restaurant where he was arrested to
"wait on a bus" and have a meal, he was nevertheless taken into custody. At
the trial the arresting officer testified that the manager had told him that
petitioner had been there "a little over a half hour and that he had not
bought anything."3 The city offered no other evidence against petitioner
except a record showing fifty-four previous arrests. The police court sitting
without a jury found petitioner guilty and fined him ten dollars on each
charge. Further state review of the case was unavailable.4 On certiorari to
the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed. It is a violation of due
process of law under the fourteenth amendment to convict a person without
evidence of his guilt. Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
By basing its decision on a finding of "no evidence whatever ... to support these convictions,"5 the Court brought into question the scope of
Supreme Court review of state judicial proceedings, and in particular the
extent to which state findings of fact will be reviewed. 6 It is true that the
Court has traditionally made an independent examination of so-called "con1 LOUISVILLE, KY., ORDINANCES § 85-12 provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person
••• without visible means of support, or who cannot give a satisfactory account of himself
... to sleep, lie, loaf, or trespass in or about any premises, building, or other structure in
the City of Louisville, without first having obtained the consent of the owner or controller
of said premises, structure, or building.•••"
2 LOUISVILLE, KY., ORDINANCES § 85-8.
3 Principal case at 200. The officer's testimony was seriously undermined at the trial
by the manager•s testimony that he personally had not served the petitioner any food, but
that a waiter or waitress might have. Principal case at 201 n.3.
4 Police court fines of less than $20 on a single charge are not subject to appeal or
review in any other Kentucky court. KY. REv. STAT. § 26.080 (1960). In response to petitioner's request for a stay of the judgment to give him an opportunity to apply for certiorari
to the Supreme Court, the police court suspended judgment for 24 hours during which
time petitioner sought a longer stay from the Kentucky circuit court. That court granted
a stay on the grounds that the petitioner's constitutional claims were "substantial and not
frivolous," Thompson v. Taustine, No. 40175, Jefferson, Ky., Cir. Ct., 1959. Principal case
at 203. On appeal by the city the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that the circuit court
lacked the power to grant the stay, but, in an extraordinary step, granted its own stay, even
though petitioner had not applied to it for a stay. Thus, the Kentucky courts indicated
their desire that the Supreme Court pass on the constitutional questions raised by the case.
See principal case at 202, 203.
5 Principal case at 206.
6 The opinion of the Court, written by Mr. Justice Black, follows an analysis similar to
that used in Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957), in which the Court held, three
Justices dissenting, that it was a denial of due process of law for a committee of bar e.xaminers to refuse to certify an applicant for admission to the bar because he had failed to
prove that he was of good moral character. In Konigsberg, as in the principal case, the
Court made an independent examination of the sufficiency of evidence to determine whether
the adjudicating body was justified in reaching the result it did.
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stitutional facts" where a conclusion of law relating to a federal right and a
finding of fact are so intermingled that it is necessary to analyze the facts in
order to pass upon the federal question.7 But to hypothesize that "sufficiency of evidence" is such a constitutional fact is to beg the question by
assuming the answer to the serious problem raised by the case: "ls sufficiency
of evidence hereafter to be considered a constitutional fact?"
The development of a broader scope of review by the Supreme Court of
state judicial decisionss makes it possible to identify three general areas in
which the Court will review state findings of fact for alleged due process
violations. First, the Court will review the facts to make sure that the defendant has not been denied a right so fundamental that it is beyond the
reach of state police power regulation.0 Here the Court is protecting substantive rights from state encroachment by means of due process interpretation. The test of constitutionality, whether the state action can be deemed
"reasonable," is determined by a balancing of police power interests and
private rights.1 0 The use of this analysis in the principal case would have
necessitated elevating "dancing with oneself" to the status of a fundamental
right, a course the Court was understandably unwilling to follow. 11 Secondly, the Court will also review the facts in cases in which it is alleged that the
defendant's trial lacked that degree of fundamental fairness demanded by
the due process clause.12 Rather than examining the quality or quantity of
evidence, this approach examines those factors, unrelated to the probative
value of the evidence, which may serve to vitiate the trial due to the conduct

7Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 385-86 (1927).
8 See KAUPER, FRONTIERS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY (1956); Forkosch, American
Democracy and Procedural Due Process, 24 BROOKLYN L. REv. 173 (1958).
9 Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956) (petitioner deprived of
fundamental right of free speech by arbitrary application of municipal charter); De Jonge
v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (arbitrary application of criminal syndicalism statute infringed upon right of free speech). See Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power, and The
Supreme Court, 40 HARV. L. REv. 943 (1927).
10 The state police power must be "exerted within the limits of those fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions ..•." Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884) (prosecution for felonies by
information not violative of due process). See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's extensive discussion of the fundamental rights concepts in Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) (conviction by state after acquittal by federal government held valid).
11 It may also be surmised that Mr. Justice Black's failure to use a substantive due
process approach was at least partially motivated by his personal conviction that the only
substantive rights immunized from the exercise of state police powers are those contained in
the Bill of Rights and "incorporated" into the Fourteenth Amendment. He has condemned the concept of substantive due process of law as a "natural law formula" and "an
incongruous excrescence on our Constitution." Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68, 75
(1947) (dissenting opinion).
12 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). In this case the Court held that the peti•
tioners were denied due process of law because they were prevented from securing counsel
of their own choice and were denied a fair hearing by failure of the trial court to provide
effective assistance of counsel in their behalf. See also Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86
(1923) (threat of violence denies due process); De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663
(1947) (denial of counsel to indigent juvenile accused of murder violates due process).
But see Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).

308

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 59

of the trial or of the police which "shocks the conscience"13 or which violates
rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."14 This analysis would
not have been appropriate in the principal case for it has never been intimated, and the Court in the principal case did not intimate, that conviction
without sufficient evidence is sufficiently shocking that it violates due process.15 Thirdly, the Court has reviewed evidentiary findings of state courts
when it is the quality of the evidence which is challenged. Evidence tainted
by perjury1s or by a coerced confession17 are typical situations in which such
inquiry has been made. The question in cases of this type is not whether
there is sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction, but whether the evidence
presented is reliable enough to do so. This classification was inapplicable
because the evidence in the principal case had no such taint. Instead of
using one of these traditional approaches to the due process question, the
Court looked to the quantitative aspect of the evidence, and held that the
amount was insufficient to sustain the conviction.1 s This fact was elevated
to one of constitutional significance when the Court concluded that the
petitioner had been denied due process of law.19
13 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (stomach pumping for evidence of
dope vitiates trial. Compare with Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957) (extraction of
blood from vein does not violate due process).
14 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (dictum).
15 Cf. Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 605 (1944), in which the Court declared that
mere error in reaching a jury verdict does not violate due process. Other cases in which
the Court has stated its view that the Constitution does not guarantee that the decisions of
state courts shall be free from error include Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948) (erroneous
interpretation of state law does not deny due process); and Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241,
258 (1907) (tax assessment error does not deprive petitioner of property without due
process).
Moreover, the Court has not been "shocked" by the admission of evidence in state
trials procured by unconstitutional searches and seizures, Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128
(1954); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
16 Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). The Court said: "The duty of this Court to
make its own independent examination of the record when federal constitutional depriva•
tions are alleged is clear, resting, as it does, on our solemn responsibility for maintaining
the Constitution involate," id. at 271. See also Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957);
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
17 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (use of a confession obtained by physical
torture denies due process). Cf. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953), where the Court
found no denial of due process despite police tactics which included holding the prisoners
incommunicado while subjecting them to intermittent questioning over a 32-hour period.
It was in this case that Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking for the majority, indicated that the
fourteenth amendment did not exact a rigid exclusionary rule of evidence but only protected against conviction on inherently untrustworthy evidence. Cf. Spano v. New York,
360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959), which indicated that coerced confessions are excluded because of the basic unfairness in attaining them and not because of their inherent untrustworthiness as evidence.
18 Principal case at 206. Here the Court followed the analysis used in Konigsberg,
supra note 6, and used in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957), in which
the Court held it to be a denial of due process to deny petitioner's application to take the
New Mexico bar examination because "[P]ast membership in the Communist Party does
not justify an inference that he presently has bad moral character." Id. at 246.
19 It is submitted that the Court could have found a denial of due process without
"second guessing" the trier of fact. It could have held that the loitering statute, supra
note I, provided petitioner with inadequate notice that his conduct fell within the statute's
prohibitory mandates, and therefore that the application of the statute to the petitioner's

1960]

R.EcENT DECISIONS

309

Review of the quantitative value of the evidence requires the Court to
determine whether the fact-finder could reasonably infer the ultimate fact
of guilt from the sum of evidence presented by the state.20 In this respect
the analysis most closely resembles that used by the Court when reviewing
convictions based upon statutory presumptions. In the principal case the
Court reviewed the reasonableness of the inference of guilt from the facts
proved; in the statutory presumption cases it reviews the rationality of the
connection benveen the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed.21 The
parallel is even more apparent, for the decision in the principal case was
based only on an examination of the uncontroverted evidence, not of contested issues.2 2 For this reason, it would be unwarranted to conclude that
the Thompson case signals the intervention by the Supreme Court into the
process by which the relative weight of evidence is determined.23 It seems
probable that the Court will confine this case to its facts in light of the
Court's historical reluctance to intervene in state fact-finding processes, and
in view of the plethora of peculiar facts in this case-no state appellate review
available; petitioner's record of previous arrests which may have led the
Court to suspect harassment; the unspoken equal protection concern because
the petitioner was a Negro; the uncontested nature of the evidence; the
judge as the sole trier of facts. If the case is so limited, the chief impact will
have been identification of problems and weaknesses in state procedures
which othenvise might have escaped public notice. But if the case portends
the Supreme Court's willingness to review the sufficiency of uncontroverted
evidence, the role of the Court in the administration of state criminal justice
will have been significantly expanded.24
Donald A. Slichter
acts was an arbitrary act in violation of due process. See United States v. Brewer, 139 U.S.
278, 288 (1891) (election procedure statute held not applicable under the facts), in which
the Court said, "Laws which create crime ought to be so explicit that all men subject to
their penalties may know what acts it is their duty to avoid. • . • Before a man can be
punished, his case must be plainly and unmistakably within the statute." See also United
States v. Lacher, 134 U.S. 624 (1890) (embezzlement statute held applicable to petitioner)
(dictum).

20 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, supra note 18, at 246-47. See also Local 10,
United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192, 197 (1953) (dictum).
21 Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467, 468 (1943) (presumption of violating Federal
Firearms Act invalidated); Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1 (1929) (presumption of fraud
from bank insolvency held invalid). See Brosman, The Statutory Presumption, 5 TuL. L.
REv. 17 and 178 (1930).
22 The only disputed fact was whether petiuoner had purchased anything to eat in the
restaurant. The Court dismissed this issue believing it to have no significance. Principal
case at 201 n.3.
23 See Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 61 (1951) in which the Court said, "The
state's ultimate conclusion on guilt is e.xamined from the due process standpoint in the
light of facts undisputed by the state." (Emphasis added.)
24 As a matter of pure speculation, it may be suggested that the Court is requiring
"substantial evidence" as it does in administrative law cases. This requires that there be
enough evidence to support the inference of guilt. As defined in NLRB v. Columbian
Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939), "[Substantial evidence means] ••.
enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it [the evidence] is one of fact for the jury."

